Abstract. It is long known [13] that every totally tight 2-person game form is Nash-solvable, that is, it has a Nash-equilibrium for any set of player preferences. Furthermore, it is also known [2] that every totally tight 2-person game form is acyclic and dominance solvable. In this short paper we generalize the first result to 3-person game forms, leaving the general n-person case open. On the other hand, we show that the second result does not carry over to more than two players. We exhibit an example of a three-person game form which is totally tight but neither acyclic nor dominance solvable.
Total tightness implies
Nash-solvability for three-person game forms 
Introduction
An n-person game form is a mapping g : X 1 × X 2 × · · · × X n → A, where X i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the set of strategies of player i, and A is the set of outcomes. We will restrict our attention to finite game forms only, that is, we will assume that the sets X i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and A are all finite. Moreover, let u i : A → R, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a real valued utility function (sometimes called payoff function) of player i, where u i (a) is interpreted as the profit of player i if the outcome a ∈ A is realized. The (n + 1)-tuple (g, u 1 , . . . , u n ) then defines an n-person game in a normal form. In this paper we are not interested in the numerical values that the utility functions assign to the individual outcomes. The only important information carried by a utility function for the concepts studied in this paper is the relative order of preferences among the outcomes. For outcomes a, b ∈ A we say that player i strictly prefers outcome b to outcome a and write a < i b whenever u i (a) < u i (b) and say that player i prefers outcome b to outcome a and write a ≤ i b whenever u i (a) ≤ u i (b). If both a ≤ i b and b ≤ i a (i.e. u i (a) = u i (b)), we write a = i b. Of course, we assume that both < i and ≤ i are transitive and that ≤ i is complete (any two outcomes are comparable).
An n-person game form g can be thought of as a n-dimensional matrix with entries from the set A. Following this terminology, the vector x = (x 1 , x 2 . . . , x n ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 × · · · × X n (sometimes called a strategy profile) can be thought of as a position in the matrix, and a pair (x, g(x)) is then called an entry of the game form g. A set of entries x with identical x j ∈ X j for all j = i (only the i-th components may differ) will be referred to as a line in direction i. A set of entries x with identical x i ∈ X i will be referred to as a hyperplane (perpendicular to direction i). Using this matrix terminology, we will also say that entry (x, g(x)) dominates entry (y, g(y)) in direction i if g(y) < i g(x) and ∀j = i : y j = x j (both entries are on the same line in direction i). Finally, we say that an entry (x, g(x)) is non-dominated in direction i if g(y) ≤ i g(x) holds for all y such that ∀j = i : y j = x j , i.e if it is non-dominated on the line in direction i which goes through position x.
Given a game defined by a game form g and n fixed orders of player preferences an entry (x, g(x)), where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), is called a Nash equilibrium (or NE for short) of the game if (x, g(x)) is non-dominated in all directions, i.e. if ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∀ y i ∈ X i : g(x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , y i , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) ≤ i g(x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i , x i+1 , . . . , x n ).
This means than no player can achieve a strictly better outcome (according to his preferences) by changing his strategy in case that all other players keep their strategies unchanged. A game form g is called Nash solvable if for all possible orders of preferences of the n players the game defined by g and the given orders of preferences has at least one NE. Quite obviously, given a game, it is not difficult to test in polynomial time whether it has a NE simply by inspecting all entries (checking if a given entry is a NE can be done in linear time with respect to |X 1 | + · · · + |X n | and the number of enries to check is |X 1 | × · · · × |X n |). On the other hand, given a game form it is not easy to verify its Nash solvability. The number of all possible orders of preferences to consider is (|A|!) n which gets computationally out of hand already for moderate values of |A| and n. Unfortunatelly, no significantly faster algorithm than the brute force one is known for testing Nash solvability in the general n player setting.
The above observation means, that it is quite interesting to derive sufficient conditions for Nash solvability of game forms, in particular such sufficient conditions, which are effectively testable. Let us for a while concentrate on the two-person case (n = 2) which is the most studied one. In [2] , the following six classes of game forms were considered: tight (T ), totally tight (T T ), Nash-solvable (N S), dominance-solvable (DS), acyclic (AC), and assignable (AS). A two-person game form g : X 1 × X 2 → A is totally tight (T T ) if every 2 × 2 subform of g (which is a two-dimensional matrix in this case) contains a constant line (row or column). More precisely, let us call g : X 1 ×X 2 → A to be a 2×2 restriction of g if X 1 = {x 1 , x 1 } ⊆ X 1 and X 2 = {x 2 , x 2 } ⊆ X 2 are 2-element subsets of X 1 and X 2 . Then g is T T if and only if for every 2 × 2 restriction g of g we have
We defer the definitions of DS and AC to Section 5, and for the definitions of T and AS we refer the reader to [2] , where more details on all six classes can be found. It was shown that for the two-person case the following implications hold
In fact, the last three implications, DS ⇒ N S ⇔ T , were obtained long ago; see [11, 12, 5] and [6, 8] , respectively. Furthermore, AC ⇒ T T is obvious; see [10] or [2] . The remaining three implications T T ⇒ AS, T T ⇒ DS, and T T ⇒ AC constitute the main results of [2] (note also that T T ⇒ DS together with the trivial relationship AC ⇒ T T implies AC ⇒ DS as stated above in (1)). The first two of them were conjectured by Kukushkin ([10] and private communications); the last one was proven in [10] and independently in [2] . All three easily result from the recursive characterization of the T T two-person game forms obtained in [2] . Let us also mention that T T ⇒ N S easily follows from Shapley's theorem [13] , although it was not explicitely claimed there as [13] deals with games and their saddle points, not with game forms. Out of the four sufficient conditions for N S in the two-player case (i.e. T T , AC, DS, and T , the last one being not only sufficient but also necessary), only the T T property is known to be testable in polynomial time with respect to the size of the two-dimensional matrix that defines the input game form. In fact, this task is trivial, since every 2 × 2 subform can be inspected in constant time, and there are only
On the other hand, no subexponential time algorithm is known for testing DS or AC (using the definition of AC, of course the AC property is efficiently testable using the T T ⇔ AC relation). Testing T is more interesting. It was shown in [6] that this task is equivalent to testing whether certain two monotone Boolean functions associated with the game form (one for each player) constitute a dual pair of functions. Thus the complexity of testing T is the same as the complexity of dualization for monotone Boolean functions, which can be done (see [4] ) in quasi-polynomial time (i.e. N log N where N is the size of the input). It should be also mentioned that, except for those given in (1) , no other implications hold between the considered six classes of game forms; the corresponding examples for all invalid implications can be found in [2] . Thus, the two-person case is fully solved with respect to the considered clasess, while much less is known for general, n-person, game forms.
Moulin [12] proved that for every n, DS ⇒ N S and DS ⇒ T . Yet, tightness and Nashsolvability are no longer related, that is, both implications in N S ⇔ T fail already for n = 3. In [6] , ⇐ was disproved, while ⇒ mistakenly claimed; then, in [8] it was shown that both implications fail for n ≥ 3.
Remark 1 For n person game forms, Nash-solvability results from tightness and the following extra assumption. An n-person game form g :
. . , n. It was mentioned in Remark 3 of [6] that tightness is sufficient for Nash-solvability of a rectangular n-person game form g and, moreover, g is the normal form of a positional n-person game form modeled by a tree if and only if g is tight and rectangular. The last statement was proven in [7] ; see also [9] .
The fact that T is no longer a suffcient condition for N S for n > 2 (if no additional assumptions are made about g as in Remark 1) also dashes any hopes to generalize the dualization procedure in some clever way to obtain an effectivly testable sufficient conditions for N S in the case of more than two players. Some other relations are known for n > 2. Of course, all the negative results (non-implications) carry over from the n = 2 case. On the positive side, acyclicity implies Nash-solvability (AC ⇒ N S) for any n, which trivially follows from the definitions of AC and N S (see Section 5 for the definition of AC). Besides that, total tightness implies assignability (T T ⇒ AS), as was shown for n = 3 in [1] , and later generalized for an arbitrary n in [3] . On the other hand, total tightness implies neither acyclicity nor dominance-solvability. Both T T ⇒ AC and T T ⇒ DS fail already for n = 3. The corresponding examples are given in Section 5.
As the main result of this paper, we prove that total-tightness implies Nash-solvability for n = 3, providing a sufficient condition for N S, which is testable in polynomial time . Whether T T ⇒ N S for n > 3 remains an open question.
Total tightness for more than two players
Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players whose subsets K ⊆ I are called coalitions and let A = {a 1 , . . . , a p } be a finite set of outcomes. Furthermore, let X i be a finite set of strategies of a player i ∈ I. A game form g : X 1 × . . . × X n → A is a function that assigns an outcome a = g(x) ∈ A to each strategy profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X.
Remark 2 Game forms are a general concept. They can be viewed as discrete functions of n discrete arguments, which is a natural extension of the concept of Boolean functions. Interpretations of game forms in terms of game (or voting) theory are typical but the same concept appers in many other contexts. In fact, among the six properties of game forms considered in the Introduction only five are related to games while assignability is not; it can be interpreted as separability [3] .
Given an n-person game form g : X 1 × . . . × X n → A and a partition I = K ∪ K of the players into two complementary coalitions, the two-person game form g K : X K × X K → A is defined in the following way. The strategies of the first player are the elements of the cartesian product X K = i∈K X i and the strategies of the second player are the elements of the cartesian product X K = i∈K X i . Naturally, for x ∈ X K and x ∈ X K we define g K (x, x) = g(y) where y originates from x and x by concatenating them and reordering the coordinates according to the X 1 , . . . , X n order.
A n-person game form g is called totally tight if g K is T T for all K ⊆ I. Furthermore, g is called weakly totally tight (WTT) if g K is T T for all K ⊆ I such that |K| = 1. Note that for a W T T game form g the entries in any 2 × 2 submatrix of g {i} can be geometrically thought of as the four intersections of two arbitrary distinct lines in direction i with two arbitrary distinct (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i. Let us also remark that although the two concepts (T T and W T T ) coincide whenever n ≤ 3 (and hence there is no difference for the main result of the paper which deals with n = 3), it makes sense to differentiate these two concepts in the next section which assumes only WTT while its results are valid for all n.
Structural properties of minimal game forms
In this section we shall consider the general n player case and assume that W T T does not imply N S. Thus we shall assume that there exist game forms which are W T T but not N S, and in particular we will be interested in those game forms which are minimal with this property. To this end let g : X 1 × . . . × X n → A be a game form which assumed to be W T T but not N S.
Moreover, let us assume that g is minimal with the assumed property, i.e. that every proper submatrix of g is N S (such a proper submatrix is of course W T T as this property is hereditary). Finally, since g is assumed not to be N S, there exists at least one order of preferences for every player, such that under this set of preferences g has no NE. Let us for the rest of this section fix one such set of orders of preferences.
We shall derive in this section several relatively strong properties which are valid for g. In the next section we will then show that such properties cannot be fulfilled if n = 3, proving that in this case no such game form exists, and hence showing W T T ⇒ N S for three players (which is in this case the same as T T ⇒ N S).
Lemma 3 Game form g contains no constant hyperplane of dimension n − 1.
Proof. Let us by contradiction assume that g contains a constant hyperplane H of dimension n − 1 and let g originate from g by deleting H. By minimality of g we get that g is N S and thus it contains a NE x (with respect to the fixed orders of preferences). Now there are two cases to consider:
1. either x is a NE of g 2. or x is dominated by an entry y in H which implies that such an entry y is a NE of g.
In any case g has a NE implying that g is N S contradicting our assumptions.
Lemma 4 Let us consider player i, the corresponding direction i in game form g, and the (a) for every j the outcome a j is in the entry at the intersection of H j with j , and (b) a j is the unique maximum on j with respect to the preferences of player i, and
Proof. Let g j originate from g by deleting H j . By minimality of g we get that g j is N S and thus it contains a NE x j with respect to the chosen orders of preferences. The only way to prevent x j from being a NE of g is that the line in direction i containing x j (let us denote this line by j ) intersects H j in some entry a j which strictly dominates x j with respect to the preferences of player i. Since a j strictly dominates x j and x j is non-dominated on j in g j , we get that a j is a unique maximum on j in g with respect to the preferences of player i. This finishes a proof of (a) and (b).
Let us consider lines j and k for j = k. Since j attains its unique maximum in H j and k attains its unique maximum in H k , these two lines cannot be the same line. Thus the lines 1 , 2 , . . . , d i are pairwise distinct, which proves that d i ≤ j =i d j because the right hand side equals to the number of all lines in direction i.
To prove (c) let us by contradiction assume that a j = i a k holds for some j = k. Let us consider the four entries in the intersections of j and k with H j and H k . Let us denote by x the outcome in the intersection of k with H j and by y the outcome in the intersection of j with H k . Since a j is a unique maximum on j we get y < i a j = i a k and since a k is a unique maximum on k we get x < i a k = i a j . However, this implies x ∈ {a j , a k } and y ∈ {a j , a k } and so the 2 × 2 matrix defined by these four entries (which is a submatrix of the game form g {i} ) is not T T contradicting the assumption that g is W T T . Hence either a j < i a k or a k < i a j must hold which of course also implies that a j and a k are different outcomes.
Since the unique maxima are pairwise different they can be strictly linearly ordered with respect to the preferences of player i. In the rest of this subsection we shall consider a renumbering and reordering of the hyperplanes according to this linear order.
Definition 5 Let us renumber the unique maxima from Lemma 4 so that a 1 < i a 2 < i . . . < i a d i , and let us renumber the hyperplanes H j and lines j , 1 ≤ j ≤ d i , accordingly. Moreover, let us reorder (permute) the hyperplanes inside of g to be consecutive with respect to the new numbering. This defines a modified game formg which we will work with from now on.
Note that permuting the hyperplanes does not affect the W T T and N S properties and so the modified game formg is still assumed to be a minimal size game form which is W T T but not N S. Note also, that if g contains no constatnt hyperplane than this property carries over tog, so we can use Lemma 3 for both g andg. Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this subsection which quite strongly specifies how the game formg may look like. 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j , x, x, . . . , x) in this order in hyperplanes H 1 , . . . , H d i for some outcome x and some index j, 0 ≤ j ≤ d i .
Theorem 6
In particular, if j = 0 then is a constant line (x, x, . . . , x), and if = j for some 1 ≤ j ≤ d i then it is a line (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j , x, x, . . . , x) for some x < i a j .
Proof. The fact that there exist
such that a j is the unique maximum on j which lies in H j (and thus is the j-th entry on j ) follows from Lemma 4 and from the way the hyperplanes where renumbered to getg from g. This finishes (a). Now let us show that j contains outcomes (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j ) in this order in hyperplanes H 1 , H 2 . . . , H j . Let us fix j and pick 1 ≤ k < j arbitrarily (if such a k exists, the statement is trivial for j = 1). Now consider the four entries in the intersections of k and j with H k and H j . Let us denote by y the entry in the intersection of j with H k and by x the entry in the intersection of k with H j . Since a k is a unique maximum on k and a k < i a j , we get x / ∈ {a k , a j }. Since a j is a unique maximum on j we get y = a j . However, now to make the 2 × 2 matrix defined by these four entries T T , we must have y = a k .
To prove (b) let us consider a line containing outcomes (a 1 , . . . , a j , x, . . .), where the entry x in position j + 1 for some 0 ≤ j ≤ d i − 2 is the first one to differ from a j+1 (the statement is trivial if j ≥ d i − 1). We shall prove that every entry in with the i coordinate greater than j + 1 is occupied by x. To this end let us fix k > j + 1 arbitrarily and assume by contradiction that position k in is occupied by some y = x. Now consider the four entries in the intersections of and k with H j+1 and H k . These entries are x and y in and a j+1 and a k in k . We have x = y, x = a j+1 , and a j+1 = a k , and so y = a k must hold to make the 2 × 2 matrix defined by these four entries T T . On the other hand, replacing the role of k by j+1 (i.e. considering the intersections of and j+1 with H j+1 and H k ) we get four entries x and y in and a j+1 and z in j+1 , where z < i a j+1 because a j+1 is the unique maximum on line j+1 . But now x = y, x = a j+1 , and a j+1 = z, and so y = z must hold to make the 2 × 2 matrix defined by these four entries T T . This gives the desired contradiction because we have z < i a j+1 < i a k and so y = a k and y = z cannot hold simultaneously. Note also that x = a j+1 implies ∈ { j+1 , k } and so the proof works also for = j .
Theorem 6 immediately implies a simple corollary.
Corollary 7
Theorem 6 works only with the lines in the direction which corresponds to player i but since i was picked arbitrarily the same statement is true for every direction. So let us from now on assume, that the game formg was in fact produced from g by permuting the hyperplanes (as described in Definition 5) in all n directions, so that Theorem 6 is valid for all n players. Now we are ready to disprove an existence of game formg for the case of three players.
Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for n = 3
Let us consider the three player case with players A, B, C. Let us slightly change the notation. Let the minimal totally tight and not Nash-solvable game formg have dimensions d A × d B × d C (we may assume dimensions at least 2 × 2 × 2 since reducing any dimension to 1 results in a two-person game form for which T T ⇒ N S is known to hold, and hence no counterexample exists), let the hyperplanes perpendicular to the direction of player A be H . Now we shall go through a rather tedious case and subcase analysis, where in every subcase we shall arrive to conclusions which contradict the existence of the game formg. The contradiction always rests in deriving one of the following three facts:
•g contains a Nash equilibrium (NE for short) contradicting the definition ofg, or
•g contains a constant hyperplane (CH for short) contradicting Lemma 3, or
• hyperplane H A j for some 1 ≤ j ≤ d A contains no outome a j which is a unique maximum on its line in direction A, contradicting Corollary 7.
The first branching is done based on the mutual relations of outcomes a 1 , b 1 , c 1 . Note, that the arguments used in the first two cases (all three outcomes identical and all three outcomes different) can be easily generalized to n player game forms for arbitrary n, while the treatment of the last case (two outcomes identical and one outcome different) relies heavily on the three-dimensionality of the game formg.
In this case we have just two possibilites. Either all three lines (1, 1, * ), (1, * , 1), ( * , 1, 1) consist only of outcome a 1 = b 1 = c 1 in which case (1, 1, 1) is a NE (which is a contradiction), or there is an element x different from a 1 = b 1 = c 1 on one of these lines. Since this case is symmetric, we may wihtout loss of generality assume that x is in position (j, 1, 1) for some index j. However, using Theorem 6 the line (j, * , 1) in the direction of player B must be a constant x line (x B-propagates since it differs from b 1 ), which in turn implies that for every k the line (j, k, * ) in the direction of player C must be a constant x line (x C-propagates since it differs from c 1 ). This means that (j, * , * ) is a CH which is again a contradiction.
Case II (all different):
Consider the outcome x in position (1, 1, 1) . Clearly, x must be different from (at least) two outcomes from the set {a 1 , b 1 , c 1 }. Due to symmetry, we may without loss of generality assume that x / ∈ {b 1 , c 1 }. By an identical argument as in the previous case (where we set j = 1) we get that (1, * , * ) is a CH. , 1) is a CH. Therefore we may in the rest of this case assume y = a 1 and moreover since this entry C-propagates we get that (1, 2, * ) is a constant a 1 line. By symmetry, also (1, * , 2) is a constant a 1 line.
Furthermore, consider the outcome z in position (1, 3, 1) . If z = b 1 = c 1 then it Cpropagates and hence z = a 1 must hold, since we already know that the entry (1, 3, 2) is a 1 . However, now either a 1 in position (1, 2, 1) or a 1 in position (1, 3, 1) B-propagates as a 1 cannot be simultaneously equal to both b 2 and b 3 . If z = b 1 = c 1 then this entry Bpropagates since b 1 = b 3 . If we summarize these observations we get that the (1, * , 1) line is either V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) or V B = (b 1 , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , b 1 ) , and the same is by symmetry true for the (1, 1, * ) line. Now we will branch again, this time based on the relation of outcome a 1 with respect to outcomes b 2 , c 2 .
Case A (equal to both) a 1 = b 2 = c 2 Note that in this case b 1 < B b 2 = a 1 and also c 1 < C c 2 = a 1 and hence a 1 dominates b 1 = c 1 in both directions in the hyperplane (1, * , * ). Let us distinguish two cases.
1. If the (1, * , 1) line is V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) (or (1, 1,  * ) line is V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) ) then each such a 1 C-propagates (or each such a 1 B-propagates). In either case it follows, that the (1, * , * ) = H a 1 , b 1 , . . . , b 1 ) then H A 1 may contain also other entries than a 1 and b 1 and we have to proceed differently. Consider the entry a 1 in position (1, 2, 2). Since both (1, 2, * ) and (1, * , 2) are constant a 1 lines, the (1, 2, 2) entry is a NE unless it is dominated by some x (such that a 1 < A x) in the direction of player A. Note that such x must be in position (2, 2, 2) because a 1 < A a 2 and so every non-dominating entry in position (2, 2, 2) would A-propagate leaving the entry a 1 in position (1, 2, 2) non-dominated. However, a 1 < A x implies x = a 1 = b 2 = c 2 and so x both B-propagates and C propagates. Thus H A 2 must contain x everywhere except in the (2, 1, * ) and (2, * , 1) lines, which in turn implies that the only candidates for the unique a 1 maximum in H Due to symmetry we may without a loss of generality consider the case a 1 = b 2 = c 2 (the case a 1 = c 2 = b 2 is symmetric). The fact a 1 = c 2 implies that the (1, 1, * ) line is V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) and each a 1 in V A B-propagates. This means that H A 1 hyperplane must contain a 1 everywhere except in the (1, * , 1) line (which may still be either V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) or V B = (b 1 , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , b 1 ) ). Note that b 1 < B b 2 = a 1 and so if b 1 < C a 1 holds than the unique a 1 maximum is a NE. So we may assume that a 1 < C b 1 and distinguish the following two subcases.
1. Assume that the entry in position (2, 2, 1) is b 1 = c 1 . We may moreover assume that every entry x in the (2, 2, * ) line satisfies a 1 < A x (in particular a 1 < A b 1 ) since otherwise the corresponding a 1 entry in (1, 2, * ) is a NE. That means that every entry in (2, 2, * ) is different from a 1 = b 2 and hence it B-propagates. The entries in (2, 1, * ) are either the same as the corresponding entries in (2, 2, * ) or they are equal to b 1 (any entry different from b 1 must B-propagate). That means that H 2. Assume that the entry in position (2, 2, 1) is x = b 1 = c 1 . This implies that x Cpropagates making (2, 2, * ) a constant x line. We must have a 1 < A x since otherwise any a 1 entry on the (1, 2, * ) line is a NE. Therefore x = a 1 = b 2 and so every x on the (2, 2, * ) line B-propagates making H A 2 an "almost" constant x hyperplane, the only exception being the (2, 1, * ) line. Note that the B-propagation of x in position (2, 2, 1) forces the (1, * , 1) line to be V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) and not V B = (b 1 , a 1 , b 1 , . . . , b 1 )  since b 1 in position (1, 3, 1) would A-propagate (recall that a 1 = b 1 ) contradicting x = b 1 . Thus we have a complete picture of H A 1 : it is a constant a 1 hyperplane with the exception of the b 1 entry in position (1, 1, 1 ). To get a complete picture of H is either x or b 1 and we already know that a 1 < A x). The fact b 1 < C x implies that the x entry in the (2, 1, 2) position is a NE unless x = a 2 and it is dominated by some entry z in the direction of player A. Note that such z must be in the (3, 1, 2) position since a non-dominating entry in (3, 1, 2) would have to be different from a 3 and hence it would A-propagate, leaving x non-dominated. Now on one hand we have that c 2 = x < A z implies that z C-propagates and so the entry in the (3, 1, 3) position is z. On the other hand b 1 < A a 1 < A a 2 implies that b 1 in the (2, 1, 3) position A-propagates and so the entry in the (3, 1, 3) position is b 1 . However, b 1 < A a 1 < A x < A z holds implying b 1 = z, which is a contradiction.
Note that the above three cases are indeed the only possibilities of how the mixture of x and b 1 entries on the (2, 1, * ) line may look like. If (2, 1, 2) is b 1 = c 1 (implying b 1 = c 2 ) then this b 1 entry C-propagates resulting in the second case. If (2, 1, 2) is x then either x = c 2 and this entry C-propagates (which is the first case), or x = c 2 in which case depending on the (2, 1, 3) entry we get again the first case ( (2, 1, 3 ) is x = c 3 ) or the third case ( (2, 1, 3) is b 1 = c 3 ).
Case C (different from both): a 1 / ∈ {b 2 , c 2 }
The fact a 1 = c 2 implies that the (1, 1, * ) line is V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) and each a 1 B-propagates. Similarly, a 1 = b 2 implies that the (1, * , 1) line is V A = (b 1 , a 1 , a 1 , . . . , a 1 ) and each a 1 C-propagates. Thus H in position (1, 1, 1) is a NE. If b 1 ≤ B a 1 and b 1 ≤ C a 1 hold simultaneously, then the unique a 1 maximum in H A 1 is a NE. This covers all the cases in which there are strict inequalities "in the same direction" and/or at least one equality between a 1 and b 1 . The remaining two possibilities when the strict inequalities go "in the opposite directions" are symmetric, so let us in the rest of this case assume that b 1 < B a 1 and a 1 < C b 1 . This implies that the unique a 1 maximum in H A 1 is a NE unless it appears in the (1, 1, * ) line. Let us distinguish two cases.
1. Let us assume that a 1 ≤ A b 1 . Let the unique a 1 maximum in H A 1 be in the (1, 1, i) position for some i > 1 and let z be the entry in the (2, 1, i) position. Clearly z < A a 1 (since z is on a line with unique a 1 maximum) and hence z < A a 2 and z < A b 1 . This implies that z both A-propagates and B propagates which means that ( * ,
is an "almost" constant z hyperplane except of the (1, * , i) constant a 1 line. However, this means that any such a 1 in the (1, j, i) position for j > 1 is a NE.
2. Let us assume that b 1 < A a 1 . Let us denote the H A 1 hyperplane without the (1, 1, * ) line as region R 1 and the H A 2 hyperplane without the (2, 1, * ) line as region R 2 . Every a 1 entry in R 1 is a NE unless it is dominated by some entry z in the direction of player A. Such z must be in R 2 since a non-dominating entry in R 2 would have to be different from a 2 and hence it would A-propagate, leaving the corresponding a 1 in H A 1 non-dominated. In particular, this means that R 2 contains no b 1 = c 1 entry which in turn implies that every entry in the (2, j, 1) position for j > 1 C-propagates creating a constant line in R 2 . Therefore R 2 is fully specified by the (2, * , 1) line, which by Theorem 6 has the form (b 1 , b 2 , . . . b i , x, . . . , x) for some index i ≥ 1 and some entry x = b i . Now we can distinguish two cases.
• If i ≥ 2 then every line in the direction of player B intersects R 2 in at least two different entries and hence the (2, 1, * ) line must be a constant b 1 line (any other entry would B-propagate). Hence every line in the direction of player B in H A 2 is a copy of (2, * , 1). Let z be the maximum element with respect to < B in (2, * , 1) (clearly either z = b i or z = x). Now either z = a 2 in which case the unique a 2 maximum in H Since the above case analysis covers all possible cases, this finishes the proof.
5 On acyclicity and dominance solvability of n-person game forms
In this section we present an example which shows that the implications T T ⇒ AC and T T ⇒ DS, which are valid for 2-person game forms, fail already for 3 players. Let us start with the definition of AC.
A n-person game is defined by a game form g and arbitrary but fixed orders of preferences of the players. Given a direction i and two entries (x, a) and (y, b) such that x j = y j for every j = i (i.e. both entries are on the same line in direction i), the move from (x, a) to (y, b) is called an improving move in direction i if a < i b holds. A non-empty sequence of improving moves which starts and ends in the same entry is called an improvement cycle of the game. (Obviously, if a game has an improvement cycle then it has one in which no two consecutive improving moves are in the same direction.)
A game is called acyclic if it has no improvment cycle. Obviously, an acyclic game has a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, a game form g is called acyclic (AC) if for any players' preferences the obtained game is acyclic. Hence, AC ⇒ N S.
In order to show that a given game form g is not AC it suffices to show one particular preference order for each player such that under these preferences the resulting game has an improvment cycle. Figure 1 shows a 3-person game form g of dimensions 3 × 2 × 2 for players {A, B, C} and three outcomes {a, b, c}. It is easy to verify that g is T T by checking all 2 × 2 submatrices of the game forms g {A} , g {B} , and g {C} . On the other hand, if we set b < A c < A a for player A (left-right direction), a < B c < B b for player B (up-down direction), and c < C a < C b for player C (front-back direction), then the resulting game contains an improvment cycle of length seven, which is marked by arrows on the edges in Figure 1 . Thus, T T does not imply AC for n = 3. Now let us define DS. Again, let us consider a n-person game defined by a game form g and arbitrary but fixed orders of preferences of the players. Given a direction i and two hyperplanes H j and H k perpendicular to direction i (these correspond to two different strategies of player i), we say that H j dominates H k if for every line in direction i (or in other words, for any preference profile of the remaining players) the intersection of with H j (let us call this entry (x, a)) dominates the intersection of with H k (let us call this entry (y, b)), i.e. if b ≤ i a. Let us consider a game form g which we get from g by deleting a dominated hyperplane. Then we say that a game defined by g and the same orders of player preferences as before was obtained from the previous game by a reduction step. We say that a game is dominance solvable if there exists a sequence of reduction steps which reduces the game to a game with a single entry. Finally, a game form g is dominance solvable (DS) if for every orders of player preferences the obtained game is dominance solvable. Similarly as in the AC case this means, that in order to show that a given game form g is not DS it suffices to show one particular preference order for each player such that under these preferences the resulting game is not dominance solvable. Again consider game form g from Figure 1 and the same player preferences as before. It is easy to see that neither of the two hyperplanes perpendicular to direction B dominates the other, since there are arcs in both directions on the improvment cycle inbetween these two hyperplanes. The same is true for the two hyperplanes perpendicular to direction C. Thus the only reduction step possible is to remove the leftmost hyperplane perpendicular to direction A which is dominated by the middle hyperplane perpendicular to direction A. However, it is easy to verify that the resulting 2×2×2 game form g together with the player preferences now define a game in which no reduction step is possible. This proves that the original game is not dominance solvable, and thus T T does not imply DS for n = 3.
